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Abstract: 
Much of the literature on democratic transitions and ethnic conflict focuses on the role of elites, 
whether as constructive contributors to ethnic harmony and pacted transitions, or as fomenters of 
disharmony. What these accounts often fail to take into account is the extent to which the 
existence of political elites is a variable in itself, particularly when their power bases are not 
organizations like an army but rather nations or classes. The article develops, based accounts of 
labor movements in transitions, an analysis of how competition for scarce militants and the 
demands of organizing them shapes the power and importance of elites. It does this through a 
case study of Catalonia in the years preceeding the Spanish transition. During those years 
Catalonia, both a stateless nation and a potentially divided society, was the site of organizing 
from the left and right that nearly monopolized militants and channeled their activity into 
autonomist, exclusive forms of nationalist mobilization that stifled attempts at internal 
polarization while creating elites who could negotiate on Catalonia’s behalf in the transition. In 
other words, the ability of moderate Catalan nationalists to organize before the transition 
explains their ability to represent Catalonia and control its fissures later, and contributes to 







Demanding only autonomy:  
The mobilization of Catalan nationhood in the Spanish democratic transition, 1970-1975 
 
Democracy might be about masses, but studies of democratic transitions and of ethnic 
conflict management tend to be about elites. Donald Horowitz and Arendt Lijphart, for example, 
do not agree on much in the study of ethnic conflict management, but in a recent debate about 
democratic design for a divided society they both agreed on the contribution that is made by 
group leaders interested in negotiation- in other words, of elites
i
. This focus appears throughout 
vast literature on ethnic conflict
ii
. Their good behavior is the prerequisite, for example, for 
consociationalism
iii
. Or national elites can choose to make ethnic conflict more intense. In a 
comprehensive review of literature on ethnic tensions, Williams argues that “social movements 
on behalf of ethnic interests have been stimulated and organized in country after country by 
ambitious ethnic entrepreneurs. Ethnic leaders at all levels from local to international always are 
tempted by, and many times use, all the devices of demonization”
iv
. In other words, elite 
activities often do much to explain the level of conflict in divided societies.  
Mainstream studies of democratic transition are equally clear about the role of elites 
commanding organized resources. The common study of “transitionology,” of course, is based 
on the study of elite pacts
v
. Discussing it, Collier notes that “the dominant framework used in 
theoretical and comparative accounts... has not only adopted an actor-based rather than a 
structural perspective, but it has tended to privilege certain kinds of actors: individual elites 
rather than collective actors, strategically defined actors rather than class- defined actors, and 
state actors more than societal actors”
vi
.   




both democratization and ethnic conflict management focus on the activities of (at least certain 
kinds of) elites. As Collier suggests, the definition of relevant elites assumes their power and 
might be biased towards those who control formal organizations with clear political roles. 
Sometimes this is acceptable; without understating the complexity of military politics, an army is 
usually a large set of complex organizations with visible hierarchies, identifiable leadership, and 
reasonably consistent self-definitions, factions, and interests.  
But, this is not the case with other groups that must be constituted, often rapidly and from 
the fragmented and demobilized bases of a society emerging from authoritarianism, if they are to 
participate in pacted transitions. But when it comes to actors such as classes or nations the 
existence of the elites necessary for a pacted transition is a variable.  
A nation is a group that, like classes, need not have the clear boundaries of a church, any 
elites who are identifiable with the precision of military hierarchs, or any leaders as able to bring 
along their followers. Without such leaders, the nation cannot “negotiate,” and it will be only 
learned later whether the deal created a national grievance that will cause problems. Or, with 
leaders who lack real implantation and mobilizational capacity in- and from that, authority over- 
their nation can make deals with which they cannot ensure compliance. 
This article examines the creation of a national elites- leaders who can command the 
resources of and negotiate on behalf of their nation- in Catalonia. Specifically, it examines the 
creation and “catalanization” of elites in Catalonia during the runup to the Spanish transition. 
The contribution of the article is to highlight the variability of national elite presence by 
discussing the work it took in one case of undisputed elite-led democratic transition. It uses 
theories developed for labor politics to start to explain that variable of national elite existence. 




among groups with collective action problems, and it has only rarely done so, it has usually been 
in studies of labor. This includes studies that highlight the importance of labor, particularly when 
it solves its collective action problems and develops organization
vii
 and ones that go beyond it to 




Fishman’s analysis of working-class mobilization during the Spanish transition highlights 
two major problems of organization that face any who would like to mobilize
ix
. The first 
problem is that of finding activists, i.e. of finding people capable of and willing to work as an 
organization’s representation in a given gathering. These people are in short supply, and 
therefore are a key resource. Whoever can get the largest number of such activists signed up is 
likely to be the dominant force in representing that social sector and in organizing it on the 
ground. Second, Fishman’s analysis directs us to the way those leaders were organized: how they 
were fit together into networks that multiplied the effects of their efforts, and also channeled 
their demands to fit with high-level leaders’ broader political projects.  
Third, and present throughout Fishman’s work in the form of the looming democratic 
transition, looking at the process of organizing directs us to their goals- the way those political 
projects were formulated as poles around which mobilization could occur and coalitions could 
form. In short, the key to the power and strategies of leaders lies in their ability to construct 
organizations that can identify and recruit local leaders; build infrastructure and networks with 
them; and then both use those leaders to extend their organization- their ability to speak for a 
mobilized social sector- and also to sustain particular political projects.  
This article takes Spain and Catalonia, a case in which it is accepted that nationalist elites 




great deal of political work went into creating the Catalan leadership and its combination of 
inclusive nationalism and autonomism (i.e. Catalanism). This was because two political forces- 
the Catalan Communist party (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, PSUC) and the activist 
Jordi Pujol- were able to mobilize most of the available activists, dominate sources of social 
protest, and thereby prevent any other leadership espousing anything else from finding activists. 
They were both Catalanist parties, and their commitment to minimal (and, eventually, formally 
agreed) Catalanist goals combined with their strength to freeze out alternative leaderships and 
ideas and make it possible for Catalonia to represent itself in the transition as a comparatively 
united nation.  
 
The Case of Spain 
 
The “very model of an elite settlement”
x
, the Spanish transition depended in large part on 
the ability of the pacting elites to control forces as disparate as discontented officers and 
nationalist separatists. “All evaluations [of the transition]...see Spanish leaders as consciously 
striving to direct events so as to minimize the potential for conflict, to craft a transition that 
would not stir up the demons on historical memory”
xi
. While the elite settlement is well studied, 
the construction of these elites, the bases of and limits to their power, and the origins of their 
preferences are far less studied in the often Madrid-centric democratization literature. 
Spain’s pacted transition required that many elites be able to use and control mass 
pressure
xii
. Strikes, assassinations, demonstrations and protests all served notice to elites and 
leaders within the state that the status quo would not be an option after the 1975 death of 
Francisco Franco
xiii




clearly visible institutions, and leaders of political movements who could, others hoped, bargain 
on behalf of the masses of strikers and demonstrators that were undermining the regime and state 
itself. The hope of other partners, for example, was that the Communists and unions, both 
obviously powerful in the working classes, could settle an agreement that would give the 
workers enough to satisfy them and restore labor peace. This accounts for the neo-corporatist 
aspect of the Spanish transition, with its incessant elite pacts, most famously those of Moncloa 
xiv
.  
It also accounts for one of the two tasks of Catalan national elites in the transition: 
representing Catalonia in the broader transition. “Nationalists” held a leading place among the 
varied mix of groups, ranging from the Church and Communists to the military and unions, 
thought to be able to pose or control threats. During the transition, the two most prominent 
stateless nations were the Basques and the Catalans. Catalan elites consequently could play a 
significant part in the transition and memories of the Civil War, which was arguably triggered by 
Catalan autonomy, made for a good prima facia case that nationalism could cause trouble. There 
was accordingly a premium on Catalan participation in the pacts that framed the new Spanish 
politics. One of the first acts of the transition, after the new government of Adolfo Súarez came 
to power and passed the Political Reform Law that mapped out the transition, was the creation of 
a Catalan “pre-autonomy” with the evocative historic name of the Generalitat. This was led by 
Josep Tarradellas, whose legitimacy came from his role as the last major politician of the 1930s 
Generalitat, and had the support of the full spectrum of Catalan parties. Miquel Roca from the 
Catalan nationalist party Convergència Democrática de Catalunya was one of the panel that 




“nationalists”) in order to make sure all social groups would be adequately represented and 
supported (the Socialists gave up a seat to do this)
xv
. In other words, key moments in the 
Transition involved incorporation of Catalan leaders.  
The second task for Catalan elites was to ensure their domestic bases- ensure that they 
“spoke for” their nation. Both Catalonia and the Basque Country contained a potentially 
explosive problem: a combination of ascriptively self-identified Basques and Catalans, many 
eager to reverse Francoist oppression and develop their own autonomy, and large populations of 
Spanish-speakers, often born elsewhere in Spain, whose commitment to the Basque and Catalan 
causes might be weak and who might even be potential supporters of a Spanish backlash. Such 
fragmentation of both representation and society happened in the Basque country, but not in 
Catalonia- it is indicative that every major party in the first Catalan autonomous legislature 
accepted the Spanish constitution (the nationalists of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
abstained on the Constitution but supported the Statute of Autonomy), and that the campaign 
against ratification of the Constitution was ineffective.  
The question, then is: what processes in pre-transition Catalan politics constructed elites 
who could both forge a consensus at home and represent it in Madrid? Some arguments are 
simple and taugological: the nature of Catalan nationalist politics is just moderate.
xvi
 The next 
section argues that the mobilizational resources of Catalonia were principally dominated by one 
of two groups- the Catalan Communist party PSUC or the networks associated with the Christian 
Democratic nationalist Jordi Pujol. These two groups, above all the PSUC, had been effective at 
extending their networks throughout Catalan society. By penetrating the leadership of local 
struggles, whether in neighborhoods or factories, and offering a combination of attractive beliefs 




resistance. The two leaderships then very deliberately and with a great deal of effort committed 
their organizations to catalanism: a combination of support for autonomy with a rejection of any 
social division, we find a great deal of political work to structure and make “catalanist” the 
opposition politics of Catalonia before the transition. 
 
Divided society, oppressed nations?: Population and the state in Catalonia 1970-1975 
 
Like the rest of Spain, Catalonia underwent rapid economic growth and urbanization in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Catalonia was less of a newcomer to urban society and industrial prosperity 
than most of Spain; one of the great mysteries of Spanish economic history is the ongoing 
prosperity and light-industrial, family-enterprise base that a distinctive Catalan economy has 
managed to maintain despite all sorts of political and economic vicissitudes
xvii
. The distinctive 
industrial base of Catalonia, and the distinctive elites it created, had for centuries defied attempts 
by the bureaucratic-aristocratic Spanish state to integrate them
xviii
. 
The changes from the 1960s onward were nevertheless dramatic. In relative terms, much 
of Spain’s growth was in Catalonia, with other regions only starting to narrow the gap in the 
1970s
xix
. A number of social changes came with this industrialization. The rapid demographic 
and economic changes of the 1960s and 1970s broke up older networks of solidarity that had 
made Barcelona’s workers famous for their ability to mobilize
xx
. New prosperity allowed a 
consumer society to arise from the poverty of the immediate postwar years while work in Europe 
raised horizons while the increasing pluralism of the society’s elites meant that the possibility of 
arranging compromises without liberal democracy steadily decreased
xxi
. 




immigrants arrived between 1950 and the peak of the immigrant population in 1970, during 
which Catalonia’s total population grew from 3.24 to 5.12 million. The immigrants came from 
most areas of Spain but above all from Andalucia, arriving at an average rate of 72,000 a year
xxii
. 
The change was particularly marked in Barcelona city and province. In 1962, just under a third 
of the inhabitants of Barcelona were from outside Catalonia
xxiii
. That same year more 
Andalucians arrived than Catalans were born
xxiv
. By 1975 these (uniformly Spanish-speaking) 
immigrants made up an estimated quarter of the population of Catalonia. On one hand, this new 
proletariat was treated badly by the regime, with their housing, education, health and municipal 
services virtually ignored, creating great discontent over time. On the other hand, the influx of 
immigrants threatened to destroy Catalan identity, or create a social divide between Catalans and 
immigrants. Such a divide seemed especially plausible as the Catalan-born workers were 
generally better educated and many small businesses were Catalan-owned.  
This fear for Catalonia was worsened by the linguistic and social policies of the regime, 
which systematically repressed Catalan identity-- above all, the Catalan language
xxv
. Catalan 
nationalists worried that the influx of immigrants, combined with the official repression of the 
language and culture, would mean the death of Catalonia as a community
xxvi
. Francesc Candel, 
the essayist who coined the term “the other Catalans” for these immigrants, summarized Catalan 
nationalist fears with a reference to a sign in the working class neighborhood of Torrassa, in the 
industrial Baix Llobregat, that declared “Catalonia stops here. Murcia begins here.” “It is not 
possible to blame them at all for their fidelity to Castilian [Spanish]” wrote Candel of the 
postwar immigrants in his famous book; “they found themselves in a hispanicized 
[castellanitzada] Barcelona...the prewar immigrants had it in their favor that they noted 






In other words, Catalonia was potentially fragmented- potentially fragmented to the point 
of conceivably becoming a divided society like its Basque neighbor. Its nationalists were fighting 
against the legacy of both a Spanish nationalist regime and social changes that made nationalist 
consensus-building more difficult. They expressed this in their fear of “Lerrouxism”- the 
development of a (presumptively populist) anti-Catalanist political party that would turn the 
“immigrants” against Catalans and the Catalan national project. The experience of such a 
movement in the 1900s, when Catalonia was much less divided, under the leadership of the 
populist Alejandro Lerroux, gave such worries credibility, There was no clear assurance that 
there would be a social consensus around Catalan nationalist demands, or that there would be a 
political leadership able to make demands for Catalonia without polarizing Catalonia internally 
between self-described Catalans and self-described Spaniards. How was anybody to develop a 
Catalan concept of identity that could combine ascriptive Catalans- those self-identified Catalans, 




Nation-building: The Political Opposition 
 
The answer was that two organizations (or networks, given the conditions of clandestinity) 
dominated the available organization and cadres, and both were catalanist- committed to Catalan 
autonomy and an inclusive understanding of Catalonia
xxix
. The largest and most important was 
that of the Communist PSUC, with its networks and leadership concentrated in the 
Spanish-speaking industrial facilities and residential areas around Barcelona. It became the 
dominant alternative for any form of organization, and that meant that leaders were likely to be 




likely therefore to be under constant pressure to accept catalanist views.  
Jordi Pujol, meanwhile, had status networks among the more rural and middle-class 
Catalans who were mostly immune to (or unaware of) the PSUC but who were if anything too 
willing to support Catalan nationalism at the expense of peaceful co-existence within Catalonia. 
Between them, they established a near-oligopoly of leaders, resources, and organization and 
froze others, including non-catalanist political forces. That allowed them to formulate demands 
and influence the general cultural climate (the latter discussed in the next section).  
The opposition in Catalonia did not start from a good base. Sanguinary repression 
unleashed by the Francoists at the end of the Civil War was staggeringly widespread and 
thorough. There were approximately 150,000 executions by the regime in Spain
xxx
, with 
approximately 13,000 executions in Catalonia between 1936 and 1953. When de Riquer and 
Culla add in the deaths from the war or from the consequent injuries and hunger, they conclude 
that between 2.3 and 2.7% of the Catalan population died from the war and the postwar 
repression
xxxi
. In addition to the executions, at least 60,000 Catalans went into exile
xxxii
. The 
regime continued with an extensive regime of Apurification@ that left those implicated in Second 
Republic politics and administration jobless if they did not recant and enjoy good luck with the 
regime’s hastily constituted local tribunals, and this was in an era during which rations were 
often dependent on work. As a result, the infrastructure of the Catalonia of the Second Republic 
was destroyed, its militants dead, exiled, or struggling for survival
xxxiii
. Some organizations, such 
as the historic parties Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (dominant in the Second Republic) and 
the Christian Democratic Uniò Democràtica de Catalunya survived, but as small nuclei mostly in 




industrialization of Spanish society that political forces began to be able to organize in 
clandestinity. These more open 1960s and 1970s  were an era that Maravall described as having 
“two worlds...political inactivity opened the door to the material goods of an increasingly 
affluent society while it also became possible to indulge in ideological radicalism...On the other 
hand, political activity against the regime led to the dark side: repression, fear, and persecution. 
Management by the regime of the boundaries between the two worlds was skillful and it 






Organized opposition to Francoism was dominated by the Partit Socialist Unificat de 
Catalunya (the PSUC), an independent party that was the homologue of the Spanish Communist 
Party (PCE) in Catalonia,
xxxv
 which with external help and adept leadership, gained a leading 
position in the resistance to Francoism. In terms of social importance in late Francoism and 
preparation of cadres, the PSUC was vital for its ability to recruit activists and organize 
clandestine political activity among the working classes of the Barcelona periphery and at the 
same time attract intellectuals through its strong university and intellectual sections
xxxvi
. 
Its dominance of the resistance among both workers and intellectuals had the side effect 
of diluting the actual number of Communists. Many militants were primarily interested in 
resisting the Francoist state in the name of rights, democracy, and (often) Catalan identity, and 
joining the PSUC was the most effective way to do so
xxxvii
. This pattern might be called 
instrumental communism- the use of membership in a social movement organization to achieve 
goals that are not precisely goals of the movement
xxxviii




way for democrats, liberals and Catalan nationalists as well as leftists of any sort to resist the 
dictatorship and so much of the Communism in Catalonia was instrumental. 
The greatest political impact of the PSUC in structuring the nature of Catalan politics was 
its Acatalanization@ of opposition politics. Rafael Ribó, a long-time activist in the intellectual 
section, former general secretary, and former leader of its successor party Iniciativa per 
Catalunya, argues that the PSUC did four things to “Catalanize” politics in Catalonia during late 
Francoism: publish books in Catalan even during the days of harshest repression; publish its 
underground newspaper, Treball, in Catalan; publish Nou Horitzons, a leading journal of 
opposition, in Catalan; and, in addition to these efforts to preserve written Catalan, it had “a 
presence in all the clandestine movements-- unions, neighbors’ movements, cultural movements, 
educational movements-- always doing pedagogy about the national liberties of Catalonia and 
the education of all the cadres, born in Catalonia or no.”
xxxix
 This last point, stressed its 1970s 
leader, is probably the most important
xl
. Given that anti-Francoist resistance was generally 
organized through the PSUC or through its allies aspiring activists were recruited into the PSUC. 
The PSUC, internally, then took on the role of pedagogy, promoting Catalan in its meetings and 
publications, and constantly reclaiming Catalan self-government
xli
.  
From this base it extended its Catalanist, autonomist influence into the two most vibrant 
social movement sectors of late Francoism: the labor movement and the urban “neighbors’ 
movements.” The PSUC cadres, almost uniquely in the urban, industrial areas of Catalonia, 
could offer experience, resources, organization and connections. The result was that they often 
assumed guiding or leading roles in these movements and did their best to mold them in a 
popular-front style autonomist Catalanism. Fishman’s point about scarce cadres
xlii




the available cadres had instrumental incentives to go with the PSUC, and the result was that 
Catalanist Eurocommunism was the dominant political alternative in the resistance. This shows 
particularly in the PSUC role in the major forms of popular mobilization: industrial action 
neighborhood movements.  
 
Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) 
 
First came the phenomenon of the Workers’ Commissions, known by their Spanish 
initials as CCOO, and in Catalonia organized into the National Workers Commissions of 
Catalonia, or CONC. The early postwar labor regime had relied on state-set wages in a rigid 
corporatism that produced a recession rather than growth. In 1958, the state backtracked, 
allowing employers some ability to fix wages independently as part of the first Stabilization Plan, 
and in 1962 it loosened the restrictions on firm-level or plant-level wage negotiations, and as part 
of that made strikes legal if almost impossible to legally hold. This was mostly a boon to 
employers seeking labor and autonomy, and served also to let off some pressure from the 
squeezed workers, but what ultimately proved most important for political organization was the 




Workers’ Commissions began to arise, mostly spontaneously, in other Spanish regions 
such as Madrid and Asturias in order to coordinate workplace demands
xliv
. CONC formed in 
1964 in a Barcelona church, after being denied use of “their” union buildings by the Francoist 
representatives who controlled the Vertical Union
xlv
.  It was made up of activist workers from 




International: Communists should infiltrate “mass fascist organizations” for “it is here that the 
masses are”
xlvi
. Second, there were workers from the Front Obrer Català (FOC), the Catalan 
Workers’ Front, and the Catholic JOC (Young Catholic Workers), groups that were more radical 
than the PSUC but rapidly incorporated into its broad goals as they worked with it
xlvii
. In 1967the 
Spanish Supreme Court declared it an illegal movement and it had to go underground after 
suffering serious damage in police repression. The Communists were better organized to survive 




In many parts of Spain, the CCOO were the first real protest movement to arise. In 
Catalonia, the PSUC and the FOC predated them and had been involved in some exhilarating 
strikes such as those of 1951, 1956, and a large 1957 action
xlix
, even if they then suffered in the 
repression that followed each time. Thus, the PSUC predated the CCOO and could supply cadres, 
networks, and expertise at the price of linking the CCOO to it and incorporating the cadres 
recruited through CCOO.  
CCOO was therefore key to Catalanizing workforce activists. Even if the strikes were 
work-related, CCOO was there responding to a demand, providing skills and techniques, and 
giving shape to militants’ activities. It came to dominate the leadership cadres of the workers. Its 
style of organizing and political demands were catalanist, thereby contributing to the linking the 
struggles of workers and of nationalists. Its language was “Andaluz” joked a leader, but it 
constantly promoted Catalan and Catalanism. Third, it was an impressive set of networks and 
connections, and thus was an important prop for Catalanist umbrella organizations. CCOO was 
as much a process as an organization or phenomenon: its effect was to increase the efficacy of 








A second source of cadres and networks attached through the PSUC- and therefore able 
to both spread the catalanist message and bolster PSUC dominance in clandestine politics- was 
the neighbors’ movements. Francoist rapid industrialization massively expanded not only the 
industrial working class but also its residences. The concrete conditions to which the Neighbors 
Movements responded were the results of unregulated, often corrupt, urban development during 
the 1960s and 1970s. In these years, an explosion of speculative construction took place, often in 
a miasma of corruption, that both housed waves of arrivals in the industrial cities and employed 
new arrivals in the booming (and corrupt) construction industry. The result was a ring of workers 
areas around the major cities, especially Barcelona and Madrid, comprised of shoddy concrete 
towers in vast neighborhoods lacking services as such as schools, clinics, hospitals, shops, or 
transport. This was presumably an improvement on the shanty towns that were still common 
around Spanish cities into the 1970s, but these areas, dominating the industrial counties of the 
Baix Llobregat and Vallès around Barcelona, still produced serious complaints. The result was a 
wave of social protest, originally in the form of demands by neighborhoods for services such as 
schools and clinics. Later it extended to relatively middle-class neighborhoods that could still 





 generally remained local and focused on improved welfare services, but 
they presented a serious structural challenge to the regime. It is impossible to separate them from 




the environment of political leaders by mobilizing large sectors of society. By 1974, 90 had 
formed in the city of Barcelona and by 1978 they had 70,000 members
lii
. They entwined with 
(and were often started by) cadres of the PSUC and CCOO activists, adopted Catalanist concerns 
as these nationalist and leftist activists came to the fore, and built links with Neighbors’ 
Movements across their cities, across Catalonia and across Spain. Much of this was due to 
intentional activity by the PSUC, but it reflected more the fact that the PSUC cadres were more 
skilled; participants in neighborhood oppositional networks; and indistinguishable from the core 
of resistance activists .  
In Catalonia, the Neighbors’ Movements provided a school and recruitment ground for 
Communist cadres. Thanks to CCOO and the Neighbors’ Movements the PSUC now had much 
deeper roots and capacity to spread its ideas among sectors it could not have reached-- ordinary 
workers, ordinary citizens, and women who participated in neither the masculine arena of the 




The PSUC, the unions its CCOO developed, the neighbor’s movements it co-opted make 
up the bulk of organized resistance activity and counter-elite formation. But their roots were 
largely confined in the industrial areas around Barcelona and in that city’s intellectual, Catalan, 
elites
liii
. Those areas and people mattered, but there was also the question of the “native-born,” 
often rural, Catalans and their views and their mobilization. The only important opposition forces 
not subject to the Catalanizing influence of the PSUC were already Catalan nationalist forces. Of 




Francoism than the PSUC, was the group led by Jordi Pujol and based first lay Catholic 
movements and later in a bank.  
Pujol and his followers, when young, engaged in some relatively high-profile symbolic 
actions that demonstrated, however evanescently, that nationalist resistance was alive and got 
him put in jail
liv
. The heroism and interest of his activities, and his followers’ continuing 
symbolic escapades absolutely validated Pujol’s nationalism. However, the real activity of Pujol 
was contained in the activity of  “fer pais,” which translates roughly as “making the country.” 
Catalonia was one of the European countries in which the Catholic social thought of Emile 
Meunier, known as Personalism, formed a bridge for the entry of Catholic youths into politics 
that had been polarized between Church hierarchies and anticlericalism. From his roots in the 
(minority) stream of Catholic thought in Catalonia, roots not sunk far from the FOC, Pujol and 
other followers of the theologian Ramon Galí constructed a democratic, Catholic ideology that 
stressed the creation of a Catalan community
lv
. This Christianity, while not strongly marking the 
political actions of Pujol, linked him to many progressive sectors of the Catholic church, 
including the Abbot of Montserrat, a monastery with a long tradition of Catalanism which 
engaged in illegal activities such as flying Catalan flags and secretly publishing books in 
Catalan.  
One way to “fer país” was to seek ways to build the social community of Catalonia 
through cultural and economic activities that would fortify the nation and help it recover. Pujol, 
his mother, and his collaborators accordingly  purchased a minor bank in the provincial town of 
Olot and converted it into Banca Catalana, an explicit bid to create a Catalan financial power that 




political and financial domination of Madrid. 
Three aspects of Pujol’s activity and the position he constructed under Francoism were  
important for the later shape of Catalan politics. First, he had good networks. His Christian 
democratic orientation, which brought him into contacts with progressive clerics, and his 
economic activity allowed him to build networks through Catalan society that would prove 
useful in constructing a political movement. It did this both by legitimating him among Catalan 
and other elites and by allowing him to find resources and cadres rapidly during the transition. In 
this his relations with the Abbey of Montserrat were particularly helpful; Montserrat had great 
status as a Catalan Catholic center, and it was a helpful center for his networking within the 
church and for clandestine meetings as well as a great legitimator of his activities. Second, as a 
banker, he was able to fund and assist opposition activities (even those to the left of him 
personally). Third, while the Franco regime treated him badly (not only by imprisoning him for 
three years but also through efforts by political appointees to sabotage his bank
lvi
), Pujol’s 
economic moderation and capacity to enunciate a Catalan nationalist discourses made him more 
appealing to possibilist, “aperturista” (openist) or reform-minded forces within the regime than 
the PSUC could be.  
Thus, for example, the aperturista leader and ex-minister Manuel Fraga Iribarne’s 
representative in Barcelona, Manuel Milian Mestre, took care to establish links with Pujol, 
noting that “he had the best team” (el mejor equipo)(meanwhile, knowing that Mestre was 
Fraga’s man in Barcelona, the PSUC had inserted a party member as his personal secretary in 
order to monitor developments
lvii
). In 1972 Mestre would organize a meeting in rural Catalonia 
between some elite Catalan fixers, Fraga, and Pujol to prepare for the Transition
lviii
. They would 







I earlier identified three components of collective action that shape the formation of elites 
for stateless nations. The leaders who can be national elites are those who successfully capture 
much of the pool of available activists and control over the networks and organization that make 
a group of activists more than isolated individuals. In Catalonia during the last years of the 
Franco regime the dominant force in both developing activists and organization was the PSUC, 
and the alternative was Jordi Pujol’s network
lix
. As the next section will argue, these were both 
able to develop an ideology of Catalanism and demands with enough shared content to be able to 
both determine who could represent Catalonia and, through control of scarce recruits and 
organization, to suffocate any efforts to divide society in Catalonia.   
 
Catalanist goals: Politics against ethnic conflict 
 
What demands- even ideology- did these organizations eventually formulate? Catalan 
intellectual life in the 1970s and 1970s, often semi-clandestine, was in great part preoccupied 
with the threat that immigration and cultural repression posed, and sought to invent formulations 
and strategies that would allow Catalan identity to survive
lx
. The problem was to conjugate a will 
to national survival with the political and social difficulty of integrating new arrivals into a 







Catalan intellectuals fell back upon the standby of language: that the true badge of 
Catalan identity was the language. In part this reflected the overwhelming role of language in the 
whole Catalan renaissance since the nineteenth century
lxi
 and its role as a possible social glue; it 
also reflected a postwar Catalan cultural revival and the regime’s own focus on suppressing use 
of the language. The signal advantage of the language is that a language can be learned
lxii
. If 
speaking Catalan is a sign of Catalan identity, then learning Catalan is enough to at least 
provisionally join the community. Thus, a language was a perfect mechanism of nationalist 
politics. It effectively transmitted national high and popular culture; it insinuated the national 
identity into anything done in Catalan; and yet, despite affording such access to the 
Catalan-speaking community, it did not exclude anybody by definition. 
The solutions that the Catalans proposed reflect the social location and composition of 
the Catalan political movements’ leaders
lxiii
. The PSUC tried to catalanize everybody with a 
leftist argument. In its most basic form, this meant the argument that both Catalans and 
immigrants were oppressed by capital and the regime, and that rather than see Catalans, some of 
whom were bosses, as the enemy, the enemy should be bosses in se. It spoke enough Spanish to 
communicate and attract followers while promoting Catalan within and without, and contributing 
to a Catalan identity that could include their non-native followers
lxiv
. 
On the other hand, there was the small nationalist core around Pujol and the large social 
sector whose ideas he could formulate. This sector, mostly Catalan by birth and by linguistic 
preference, and primarily based in the middle classes, remaining small manufacturers, and the 
numerous shopkeepers (botiguers), was composed of many people grappling with the problem of 




numbers of immigrants arriving from the very heartland of the regime. Language promotion 
again fitted the bill as a way to construct Catalonia. Pujol was one of the major organizers and 
funders of Omnium Cultural, which began as an organization teaching Catalan and was promptly 
banned for some years, continuing in clandestinity
lxv
.  
The PSUC was large and had sunk roots into most industrial areas of Catalonia, with 
strong followings in the immigrant neighborhoods. Between that and its networks across the 
union and neighbors’ movements, it could claim the typical skilled or even interested activist 
under clandestinity, giving it an enormous headstart in creating a consensus. Furthermore, 
devices such as the Assemblea de Catalunya, by including non-members of the PSUC, explicitly 
worked to create a Catalan consciousness among the larval Socialist and other groups. Pujol 
occupied a different role. Pujol, with his authentic image, his networks, his nationalist credentials 
and his resources, was able to present ascriptive Catalans with an understanding of Catalanism 
and Catalonia that incorporated the immigrants. Outlined in a number of books
lxvi
, this view was 
the ideological complement to his influence.  
 
Social thought  
 
In addition to language and art revivals the increasing prominence of new Catalan 





, broadcasting, architecture and urbanism
lxix
, 
there were younger generations within the organizations planning how to develop Catalanist, 
democratic institutions in their fields. Given the small size of Catalonia and its institutional elites, 




society most often appeared in the Church-protected, Catalan-language review Serra d’Or. 
Discussions also drew extensively upon the more theoretical journal Taula de Canvi, modeled on 
the influential international New Left Review, and the widely-read catalanist journal of history 
and current events L’Avenç. It was represented in books, predominantly those published by 
Edicions 62 (which worked with support from both Pujol and the PSUC
lxx
). In less prominent 
fields, such as cultural policy, there were intensive meetings with publications as a result. The 
result was that a Catalan government (and Spanish ones) would have extensive banks of policy 
and institutional design thinking, most of it leftist, waiting for them, and support within the 
organizations charged with carrying out that policy.  
 
Political demands of the Assemblea de Catalunya 
 
The symbolic culmination of the development of a Catalanist consensus was the 
Assemblea de Catalunya. If the PSUC’s participation in the Neighbors’ Movements and CCOO 
meant that it commanded the loyalties of most willing cadres, and was able to influence what 
they said, the Assemblea de Catalunya allowed it to make explicit its leading role among Catalan 
intellectuals and similarly help stifle non-Catalanist alternative politics. The Assemblea was an 
assembly of democratic forces of Catalonia that began in November 1971.It was made up of 
groups and individuals who could represent “active sectors,” and those who sought to find and 
include representatives of the middle classes had very poor results
lxxi
. As a group of the existing 
resistance the PSUC loomed large as its focus and was its organizational mainstay.  
The Assemblea made explicit the Catalan autonomist consensus. This formal version of 




Liberty referred to their demands for a liberal democratic state; amnesty to the call for the release 
of political prisoners, and the Statute of 1932 to the restoration of the statute that created the 
autonomous Catalan government of 1932, called the Generalitat. The call to the Statute was a 
lowest-common denominator goal negotiated within the Assemblea-- there had been calls from 
more nationalist sectors, for example, to demand unification in a Catalan region of Catalonia 
with Valencia and the Balearic Islands (the “Catalan Lands”)
lxxii
. It also explains why the 
demands include nothing about political organization other than autonomy and liberty.  This 
lowest common denominator was quite powerful, however, as it meant that the entire resistance 
movement was now agreed on the necessity of Catalan autonomy and on the floor-- the powers 
of the 1932 Generalitat-- below which the autonomy would be unacceptable. These demands 
would go on to be the core demand of the Catalan political coalition right through to the approval 
of the Statute of Autonomy 
 
Conclusion: Catalan politics into the transition 
 
The Spanish transition to democracy began with the death of Franco in 1975, but it 
remained unclear whether the transition would succeed until at least 1983 when the opposition 
Socialists took power from the center-right. In those eight years, three democratic general 
elections had been held, the first of those elections had chosen a committee to write a 
constitution that it subsequently passed and which was endorsed in a referendum, the statutes of 
autonomy for regional governments including Catalonia’s Generalitat had been passed and 
endorsed in referenda, regional governments had been constituted and the whole new structure 




were represented because frustrated Catalan nationalism was seen as a significant threat. In those 
conflict-filled years, when levels of labor and other conflict as well as terrorism were very high, 
Catalan elites were constantly represented in debates and it was understood that the pressure 
mobilized Catalans could apply was a threat to the success of the transition like the pressure 
other groups such as the army or unions could apply. The huge 1977 rally that the Assemblea de 
Catalunya pulled off right after the first democratic general elections, with the help of Pujol as 
well as its PSUC progenitors, was a clear-cut demonstration of the power of mobilized 
catalanism in the service of the autonomist demands of the Assemblea
lxxiii
.  
At the same time, the consensus survived efforts both to establish more hard-line 
Catalanist political forces (such as that of the secessionists of the small Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya) and forces called “Lerrouxist” such as the Andalucian Socialist Party that was trying 
to organize in Barcelona’s industrial areas on a platform of immigrant rights. They were both 
suffocated by the lack of resources- the available cadres were taken up by what was emerging as 
Convergencia, or by the existing PSUC-CCOO hegemony among militants in the industrial areas 
around Barcelona. 
In both cases, this success was because the PSUC, in industrial Barcelona, and in more 
solidly Catalan sectors Pujol, had been able to establish such dominance of leaders as to stifle 
alternative political forces. Their hegemony would decline rapidly as the transition went on and 
“normal” party politics began to emerge, but the had both put a great deal of effort into the task 
of channeling resistance in catalanist, autonomist ways and defeating threats to the unity of the 
six million people, all of whom the Assemblea’s  slogan “Som sis mil.lions” turned into Catalans. 





This unified Catalanist movement, with considerable powers of resource mobilization 
and a small pool of leaders with strong organization who were committed to the catalanist 
consensus, could not have happened by accident. The pool of potential leaders of clandestine 
resistance and other resources was small, as everywhere, and in Catalonia largely tapped out by 
the pro-catalanist forces of the PSUC and Pujol. The development of organization, the 
development of a catalanist bias to it, and the formulation of basic principles (liberty, amnesty, 
and the Statute as well as the overwhelming focus on the Catalan language) were all the 
consequences of successful resource mobilization that did not just give voice to a nation; it also 
very much helped create it as it is today.  
In Spain, “the very model of an elite transition,” then, we find that the substantial role for 
national leaders was a function of their ability to channel many different sorts of collective action 
into the formation of a national coalition. Leaders who claimed to speak for Catalonia, to have 
any support from that coalition, would have to agree with its basic catalanist demands. This 
proposition does not undermine the many theories of ethnic conflict management and democratic 
transitions that focus on the role of elites. Rather, it focuses on the extent to which the existence 
of national elites such as they is variable, the consequence of hard political work that has gone 
into organization, collective action, and the development of a political coalition around key 
demands. If Lijphart, Horowitz and the others are right, and the behavior of national elites is key 
to successful ethnic conflict management in democratic transitions, then we probably need more 
understanding of such elites as a dependent variable, a dependent variable antecedent to 
elite-based studies of ethnic conflict management or democratic transition. 
Democratic stability and peaceful coexistence both take political work- work to organize, 




their organization must not presuppose their existence and contribution to stability. That too 
takes work. 
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